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Comment
All True Histories Contain Instruction: Why HMOs Cannot
Avoid Malpractice Liability Through Independent
Contracting With Physicians
Jennifer S. Anderson*
"All true histories contain instruction; though, in some, the treasure may
be hard to find .... 
No one can deny that the face of American health care has changed
dramatically over the past two decades. 2 Although the health care industry con-
tinues to rank among the most prosperous industries in the country,3 health care
delivery has undergone major transformations. Traditional indemnity insurance
plans have largely given way to Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans.
4
Controversy accompanies change and one of the greatest controversies
surrounding the explosive growth of the HMO industry has been the distribution of
tort liability between doctors and managed care entities.5 For many years, HMOs
were shielded from all tort liability by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 a federal statute enacted in part to encourage employee-
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 1999; B.A., Psychology,
California State University, Chico, 1992. Thanks to my brother, Dan, for giving me the inspiration to write this
Comment.
1. ANN BRONTP, AGNES GREY (1847), quoted in COLUMBIA DICrIONARY OFQUOTATIONS (Colum. Univ.
Press 1993).
2. See Laura H. Harshbarger, Note, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a
Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSEL. REV. 191,218 (1996) (outlining the tremendous growth of the HMO
industry in the United States since the 1970s).
3. See CASTLE CONNOLLY MEDICAL LTD., THE CASTLE CONNOLLY GUWE TO THE ABCS OF HMOs. How
TO GETTHE BEST FROM MANAGED CARE 14 (1997) [hereinafter THE ABCs OF HMOs] (noting that in 1996, 14%
of the nation's gross national product was consumed in health care costs).
4. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINSTWEALTH 13 (1996) (stating that HMOs are currently enjoying
an enrollment boom of 100,000 new members per week); Michael Jonathan Crinfeld, 7ilting at HMOs, 17 CAL.
LAW. 46.48 (1997) (explaining that the managed care industry regulates health care for 150 million Americans).
5. See generally Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285 (1995) (exploring issues. problems and trends in the
distribution of malpractice liability between physicians and HMOs); John R. Penhallegon, Emerging Physician and
Organization Liabilities Under Managed Health Care, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 347 (1997) (discussing the theories of
physician and HMO liability which have emerged with the advent of managed care); Win. T. (Bill) Robinson, III,
New Deep Pocket: Managed Care Entity Liability for Alleged Improper Denial of Access, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 357
(1997) (recognizing that the growth in the HMO industry has resulted in an attempt by the plaintiffs' bar to spread
malpractice liability between doctors and managed care entities).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
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benefits packages by immunizing plan providers from liability.7 Slowly, lawyers
and legislators have been whittling away at the ERISA shield.8
Plaintiffs have realized limited success in suing HMOs for physician mal-
practice under theories of vicarious liability or ostensible agency.9 In response,
managed care industry leaders have published guidelines suggesting that HMOs can
avoid liability through independent contracting with plan physicians.10 These con-
tractual relationships have become commonplace in the managed care industry."1
But in the end, such efforts may prove futile.'
2
The advent of vicarious liability and ostensible agency claims against HMOs
mirrors the history of claims against hospitals for physician malpractice. 3 Although
such claims were once uniformly rejected by the courts, 4 plaintiffs slowly chipped
away at hospital immunity to the point where even independent contractor associ-
ations with physicians would not shield hospitals from vicarious liability in all
circumstances.' 5 HMOs should heed this warning.
In Part I, this Comment discusses both the rise of the managed care industry in
the United States and the era of immunity from liability these entities have enjoyed
7. See infra Part III.A-B and accompanying text (detailing the enactment of ERISA, the purpose behind
the legislation and how it operates to protect HMOs from malpractice liability).
8. This Comment will not discuss legislative attempts to erode ERISA's protection of HMOs. However,
by way of example, in 1996 more than 1,000 bills relating to the regulation of HMOs were introduced in state
legislatures. David Mechanic, Managed Care as Target of Distrust, 277J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1810,1810 (1997). For
further detail on this subject, see Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the Laboratory of the States, 278
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1102 (1997).
9. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text (describing how the judicial erosion of ERISA's broad
protection of HMOs has resulted in limited success forplaintiffs bringing vicarious liability claims against managed
care companies).
10. See, e.g., Alan Rutkin & Erica Garay, How to Negotiate Contracts In an Era of Managed Care, 25
MANAGED CARE WK., July 15, 1996, at 1056 [hereinafter How to Negotiate Contracts] (suggesting that HMOs
attempt to avoid vicarious liability claims by including an express provision in physician contracts stating that
physicians are independent contractors, not employees of the HMOs); see also McDonough v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
324 A.2d 542,545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (acknowledging that employers are not generally liable for torts committed
by independent contractors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTs § 409 (1965) (providing a general principle of tort
law that the employer of an independent contractor cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the acts of the
independent contractor).
11. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (stating that independent contractor relationships are the
most popular arrangement used between HMOs and physicians).
12. See infra Parts M -I.D - V (arguing that HMOs should not be protected from malpractice liability through
independent contracting with physicians).
13. See infra Parts I.A, III.A (explaining the complete liability shields enjoyed by both hospitals and HMOs
in the past); infra notes 71-7 " and 137-44 (noting that the liability shields enjoyed by both entities were largely
based on mistake); infra Parts II.B, III.C (outlining the erosion in immunity from liability experienced by both
entities); infra Part II.C and accompanying notes (illustrating that both entities faced the erosion of their immunity
from liability by entering into independent contractor relationships with physicians).
14. See infra Part III.A (outlining the "charitable immunity doctrine" which once shielded hospitals from
liability).
15. See infra Part IT.D (explaining the rationale used by courts for imposing vicarious liability on hospitals
for physician malpractice despite independent contractor relationships between the two).
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under ERISA. t6 Part I also explores reasons why malpractice suits against
physicians are not sufficient to redress patient injuries. t 7 Part II outlines the advent
of vicarious liability claims against hospitals for staff-physician malpractice.18 Part
III illustrates how patient claims against HMOs have paralleled the hospital claims
up to a certain point. t9 The section concludes by showing that the parallel should
continue; i.e., that HMOs should not be able to shield themselves from liability
through independent contract relationships with physicians.20
I. THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION INDUSTRY
A. The Rise of the HMO Industry in the United States
Most Americans receive their health care coverage through employee benefits
packages whereby the employer pays all or part of the premiums for employee
policies.2 Until recently, most employees became covered by indemnity-type in-
surance plans.22 But employers were frustrated with the rapid rise in premium
costs.23 The escalating costs of health care led to a federal response.24
16. See infra Part I.A -B (giving an overview of the HMO industry by discussing the rise of the managed
care industry in the United States and the immunity from suit these entities have enjoyed under ERISA).
17. See infra Part I.C (opining that malpractice suits against physicians are not sufficient to satisfy patient
claims).
18. See infra Part II (discussing how hospitals went from entities completely immune from liability to
entities which could not even shield themselves from liability through independent contracting with physicians).
19. See infra Part In.A-D (illustrating that, like hospitals, HMOs once enjoyed a blanket immunity from
suit and observing that both entities tried to protect themselves through independent contracting with physicians
as the immunity began to erode).
20. See infra Parts In.C-IV (arguing that HMOs should not be able to avoid vicarious liability claims
through independent contracting with physicians).
21. See Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, HMO Liability-Part 11I: ERISA Preemption, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
2, 1997, at 3 (noting that most people become members of their HMOs through their employment); see also M.
William Salganik, Most Workers Under Managed Care Plans; 80% Are Covered in This Region, BALTIMORE SUN,
Jan. 21, 1997, at Cl (stating that 80% of employees in the Washington, D.C.-Baltimore region are covered by
HMO plans and that the national figures are similar).
22. Until the 1980's, most people who received health care coverage as part of an employee benefits
package were covered by indemnity plans. See THE ABCS OF HMOs, supra note 3, at 13-14. Under indemnity
plans, patients would visit their doctor, pay the bill and then seek reimbursement from their insurance company at
a later date. Id. Physicians and hospitals billed on a fee-for-service basis and were reimbursed according to a "usual
and customary" fee schedule. Id. The fee schedule was based on local average charges for the particular service,
leaving the patients to pay for any charges falling above the average. Id. Critics of indemnity insurance charged that
the plans left doctors with "built-in incentives.., to do more and to charge more" since regardless of who paid the
bills under an indemnity system (the insurance company, the patient or both), doctors always received the amount
requested for their services. Id.
23. See ANDERS, supra note 4, at 16-17 (providing an example of employer frustration by telling the story
of Edward Hennessy, chairman of Allied Signal, who was very disturbed to find in 1987 that expenses for employee
health benefits had been increasing at a rate of 39% per year).
24. SeeTHEABCIsOFHMOssupra note 3, at 16 (acknowledging that the Health Maintenance Organization
Act of 1973 was a Congressional response to the continually increasing costs of health care).
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In 1973, Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act to ensure
that American workers would not lose their medical coverage as a result of the
rising cost of employee medical benefits.26 The Act mandated that employers with
twenty-five or more employees had to provide coverage for their workers from a
federally qualified HMO.27 With this federal legislation in place, HMOs were ready
to take over the marketplace.28
Contrary to what most people believe, HMOs are not strictly insurance com-
panies.29 They do not compensate doctors on a fee-for-service basis as did the
traditional indemnity plans. 30 Rather, HMOs are a system of "organizing, delivering
and financing health care.'
Health Maintenance Organizations achieve this comprehensive control in a
number of ways. First, a managed care plan organizes groups of doctors to provide
all medical services for members of the plan.32 Under most managed-care plans,
doctors are not reimbursed according to the services they provide.33 Rather, the
doctors and the HMOs negotiate prior to treatment to determine the amounts that
will be paid for various procedures.Y Under many managed care models, doctors
are paid based on a "capitation" system whereby they receive a fixed rate for
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (West 1971 & Supp. 1997).
26. See S. REP. No.93-129(1973) (expressing concern over the fact that national health care expenditures
increased by 188% between 1960 and 1971, and noting that since many Americans were unable to afford this basic
necessity, President Nixon encouraged the development of HMOs to increase overall access to health care in the
United States).
27. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e(c)(l)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997) (defining a federally qualified HMO as one
demonstrating financial stability, sufficient protection from the risk of insolvency and sufficient administrative and
managerial organization); id. § 300e-9 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (requiring that any employer with at least 25
employees provide a health benefit plan and acknowledging that offering employees coverage under an HMO is
sufficient to avoid the civil penalties imposed on employers who do not comply with the statutory mandate).
28. They may have donejust that. Currently, 73% of American workers are covered by a managed care plan
and the number of employees enrolled in managed care plans quadruple the number enrolled in indemnity plans.
See THE ABCS OF HMOs, supra note 3, at 17, 20.
29. See id. at 16 (noting that in addition to providing the typical insurance function of paying medical bills,
managed care organizations also organize and deliver the care a patient receives).
30. See Bearden & Maedgen. supra note 5, at 290-91 (1995) (comparing the fee-for-service method of
reimbursement under indemnity insurance plans with reimbursement under HMO plans which involves a fixed
payment by the patient combined with a pre-negotiated arrangement between the plan and its physicians); see also
Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. CIV.A.95-7816, 1996 WL 220979, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996)
(contrasting indemnity plans with HMO plans by noting that the former typically use retrospective review of
procedures while the latter review payment requests prospectively and concurrently).
31. THE ABCS OP HMOs, supra note 3, at 16.
32. See id. at 35 (explaining that the managed care company selects the doctors its members can choose
under the plan).
33. See Amy Sessler, HMOs Institute Incentives Aimed at Emphasizing Preventative Care, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 21, 1997, at 7 (acknowledging that before the advent of the HMO industry, doctors were typically paid on
a fee-for-service basis, but that under managed care, doctors are now paid according to a fixed rate for each patient).
34. See Bruce D. Platt& Lisa D. Stream, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of
Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the Quality of Care Provided by Health Maintenance Organizations, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 489,496 (1995) (explaining that the typical practice of HMOs is to negotiate a guaranteed patient
flow for doctors in exchange for a discounted fixed fee for services).
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treating all members of the plan who use their services during the year.35 Under this
system, doctors have a financial incentive to do less rather than more for patients
because HMOs do not provide extra compensation for additional procedures.36
Patients mistrust managed care companies and view them as putting profits
before patient care.37 Newspapers and magazines include numerous reports of
patients who have suffered at the hands of the HMO empire.38 Doctors are also
critical of these corporate giants.39 The justice system has added to patients' and
doctors' concerns because the system has allowed HMOs to avoid answering for
their wrongs.'
B. The ERISA Shield
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)4t controls the
administration of employee benefit packages and the rights of those covered under
such plans.42 This Act applies to any employee benefits plan as long as the plan was
35. See Gregg Easterbrook, America's Top HMOs, Healing the Great Divide, How Come Doctors and
Patients Ended Up on Opposite Sides?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE'., Oct. 13, 1997, at 64 (noting that under
capitation, HMOs pay physicians a "fixed fee" of about $150 per year for each patient enrolled in the plan,
regardless of how much treatment the patients need or receive); see also ANDERS, supra note 4, at 26 (explaining
how physician reimbursement by capitation works).
36. See THE ABCs OFHMOS, supra note 3, at 14-15 (revealing that the indemnity system gave doctors the
incentive "to do more and to charge more," and noting that an additional problem under indemnity plans is that they
are geared toward treating-rather than preventing-illness).
37. See Alex Pham, HMOs Seek to Cure Image Malady Study: Few Horror Stories Have Damaged Industry,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1997, at Cl (reporting that only tobacco companies are ranked lower than HMOs on a
list of industries that serve consumers).
38. See Morton Kondracke, With Problems Mounting in Health Care System, ime is Right for Major
Surgery, SACRAdENT'o BEE, Nov. 1, 1997, at B8 (noting that horror stories about people dying due to financial
decisions made by HMOs show up daily in the newspapers); see also Glenda Vinders, When HMO Says No,
Patient Really Pays, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), Jan. 21, 1998, at 5 (outlining the inferior orthopaedic care
received by the author under an HMO plan as compared to prior orthopaedic care she received under an old
indemnity-type plan).
39. See Alicia Ault Barnett, Who Needs the Middleman? Third-Party Players in the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, BUS. & HEALTH, Jan. 1, 1997, at34 (discussing the recent surge in "provider sponsored organizations"
-managed care entities developed and run by doctors who are fed up with practicing in the managed care setting);
Michael Johnson, Forces Behind HMO Regulation, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 7, 1997, at B7 (reporting that because
of their discontent, California medical professionals spent $3.5 million in 1996 on ballot initiatives aimed at
tightening up regulation of HMOs).
40. See NBC News Sunrise: Profile: Growing Dissatisfaction with Managed Care is Fostered by Delayed
Treatment, Often at Patients' Expense (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1997) (illustrating the frustration felt by
patients who are left without recourse against HMOs due to the ERISA "loophole" that allows the entities to escape
liability in most circumstances); see also infra Part 1II.A - B (providing an explanation of how ERISA works to
allow liMOs to escape liability).
41. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (Vest 1985 &Supp. 1997).
42. See Robert Armand Perez, Sr., Health Administration Responsibility Project, ERISA Litigation
Fundamentals (visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.harp.orgtperez.htm> (outlining the basics of the comprehensive
ERISA legislation).
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established by or is maintained by an employer.43 Employee benefit packages that
provide health care are covered by ERISA."
In enacting ERISA, Congress intended to protect employee rights.45 This Act
does not mandate that employers provide employee benefits packages.46 But in an
effort to persuade them to do so, Congress granted employers and the companies
chosen to provide their benefits, "substantial immunities from liability. '47 Iron-
ically, Congress' actions may have hurt employees by leaving them without redress
against an industry which would later dominate American health care.
48
C. Why Not Just Sue Doctors For Medical Malpractice?
Common sense dictates that the doctor who administers sub-standard health
care should alone be liable for malpractice. While some of the traditional policy
rationales of the vicarious liability doctrine would seem to support that notion, other
policy considerations justify a shared risk between doctors and HMOs. 49 For
example, when doctors are paid on a "capitated" basis,5" they have a financial incen-
tive not to order tests or perform additional procedures for their patients."1 It may
43. See a.
44. An employee welfare benefit plan is defined under ERISA as "any plan, fund, or program which [is]
... established or maintained by an employer.., for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries.., medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits .... 29 U.S.C.A. §1002(1) (West 1997).
45. See Harshbarger, supra note 2, at 217 (asserting that although protection of employee rights was not the
only reason for Congress' enactment of ERISA, the legislative history suggests that such a purpose was paramount).
46. See HEALTH ADMINISTRATION RESPONStBILITY PROJECT, ERISA OumNE, (visited Jan. 31, 1998)
<http://www.harp.orglerisa.htm> (stating that rather than dictating to employers that they had to provide employee
benefits plans, the statute gave them attractive incentives to do so).
47. Id.
48. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress ended up hurting employees
by enacting ERISA). At least one author suggests that since HMOs were few in number when ERISA was enacted,
it is unlikely that Congress could have anticipated the impact this legislation would have on American workers. See
Harshbarger, supra note 2, at 218.
49. See PCHARDA.EPSTN, CASESANDMATERALSONTORTS455 (6th ed. 1995) (demonstrating that since
the early nineteenth century, the "deep pocket" was used as the main rationale for holding a master liable for the
negligence of a servant and noting that this rationale was justified because most servants were too poor to satisfy
claims by injured plaintiffs); John Dwight Ingram, Vicarious Liability of an Employer-Master: Must There Be a
Right of Control?, 16 N. ILL U. L. REv. 93, 94 (1995) (citing the "deep pocket" principle as one of the main
rationales for the imposition of vicarious liability). This rationale does not seem to translate well to the physician
context, because physicians, if not independently wealthy, are usually covered by large malpractice insurance
policies. But see Robert Pear, HMOs Reject Malpractice Liability, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996, at I (predicting
that the number of vicarious liability claims against HMOs will increase in the future because managed care entities
have such deep pockets).
50. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the capitated system of physician
reimbursement).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that under a capitated system, doctors have a financial
incentive to provide patients with fewer services).
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not be fair solely to blame doctors for their failure to treat when the entities that pay
them have made it lucrative to do less for the patient.52
Additionally, some HMOs severely limit a patient's access to specialists,
thereby forcing general practitioners to offer specialized treatment that may fall
outside their area of expertise.53 Managed care companies also advertise that they
provide the best possible medical care, thus implying that doctors in the plan are
either employees of the HMO or that they were carefully screened before joining
the network.54 If that is the case, allowing doctors to carry the entire liability burden
cannot be justified.55
II. THE ADVENT OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR THE MALPRACTICE OF STAFF
PHYSICIANS
Much recent writing has been devoted to the study of vicarious liability claims
against HMOs for the malpractice of plan physicians. 56 The advent of vicarious
liability claims against HMOs has mirrored the advent of such claims against
hospitals.57 Both entities enjoyed periods of immunity from liability and in both
cases such immunity was based on mistake or oversight.5' Both entities have
witnessed an erosion of their liability shield due in part to a basis in policy which
fails to satisfy the times.59 Both entities have responded by attempting to avoid
liability through independent contracting with physicians.6° But hospitals have
52. See Sara Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 241,261
(1997) (describing the dilemma physicians face under capitated reimbursement plans; they have a financial
incentive not to treat, yet they bear the majority of the risk for malpractice when the decision not to treat turns out
to be wrong).
53. See Pear, supra note 49, at I (revealing that the use of generalists has a great influence over the care a
patient receives under an HMO plan).
54. See id. (suggesting that there is some hypocrisy in the way HMOs aggressively market themselves and
then seek to avoid liability for the malpractice of plan physicians).
55. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text (arguing that the way an HMO advertises its physicians
should have a bearing on the entity's vicarious liability for physician malpractice).
56. See generally Brooks Richardson, Comment, Health Care: ERISA Preemption and HMO Liability-A
Fresh Look at ERISA Preemption in the Context of Subscriber ClaimsAgainst HMOs, 49 OKLA. L REV. 677 (1996)
(discussing vicarious liability claims against HMOs under ERISA); 0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and
Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's Impact, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1047 (1995)
(examining vicarious liability claims against HMOs under theories of respondeat superior and ostensible agency);
William A. Chittenden, nm, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT &
INS. L. 451 (1991) (providing a historical analysis of vicarious liability claims against HMOs and predicting the
future success of such claims).
57. See infra Parts I - III (drawing a parallel between vicarious liability claims against hospitals and those
against HMOs).
58. See infra Parts II.A, III.A and accompanying notes (outlining the immunity from liability and illustrating
that in both cases the immunity was based on mistake).
59. See infra Parts II.B, III.C and accompanying notes (explaining the erosion of immunity from liability
both entities have suffered).
60. See infra notes 90-102, 184-85 and accompanying text (noting that both hospitals and HMOs have used
independent contracting with physicians to avoid vicarious liability claims).
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learned that clever contracting will not save them from vicarious liability claims.
61
Because of their similarity to hospitals, managed care entities should suffer the
same fate.
A. A Liability Shield for Hospitals: The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity
In the early part of the twentieth century, as patient care moved from the home
to centralized hospitals, 62 hospitals began to face suits for physician malpractice.
63
These early claims did not present much of a problem for hospitals, however,
because hospitals were protected by the doctrine of charitable immunity.64 This
doctrine allowed non-profit organizations, including not-for-profit hospitals, to
escape liability for the negligent acts of employees. 65 The policy rationale for this
immunity was twofold: First, because hospitals provided a helpful service to people
(sometimes without charge) they should not have suffered the consequences of
injuries that resulted from their kindness.66 A second rationale, applicable only in
cases of physician malpractice, was that no master-servant relationship existed bet-
ween hospitals and physicians, and thus, vicarious liability did not apply.67
61. See infra notes Part II.D (providing an explanation for why courts eventually disallowed hospitals to
shield themselves from liability through independent contracting with physicians).
62. See Cassandra P. Priestley, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of hIdependent Contractors: A
Summary of Trends, 50 J. Mo. BAR 263, 263 (1994) (noting that this change in the location of patient care
accompanied other drastic changes in health care such as the routine performance of what were once considered
extraordinary procedures).
63. Although hospitals are obviously sued for reasons outside physician malpractice, this Comment focuses
on the doctrine of charitable immunity as applied to malpractice cases.
64. See John Dwight Ingram, Liability of Medical Institutionsfor the Negligence of hidependent Contractors
Practicing on their Premises, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 221, 221 (1993) (chronicling the tradition of
hospital immunity under this doctrine).
The doctrine of charitable immunity did not apply solely to hospitals. See, e.g., Coolbaugh v. St. Peter's
Roman Catholic Church, 115 A.2d 662, 663-664 (Conn. 1955) (holding that a charitable organization is "not
responsible in damages to those who seek its benefits for any injury they may suffer through the negligence of its
servants or agents" and applying the doctrine of charitable immunity to protect a church from liability for the
negligence of its sexton).
65. See Jeanne Darricades, Comment, Medical Peer Review: How is it Protected by the Health Care Quality
ImprovementAct of 1986?, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 263, 265-66 (1992) (explaining the charitable immunity doctrine as
applied to hospitals).
66. See Morrison v. Henke, 160 N.W. 173, 175 (Wis. 1916) (stating that "[s]ince [a hospital] ministers to
those who cannot pay as well as those who can, thus acting as a good Samaritan, justice and sound public policy
alike dictate that it should be exempt from the liability attaching to masters whose only aim is to engage in
enterprises of profit or self-interest"); see also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(referring to this principle as an "implied waiver" and explaining that such a waiver results when an individual
benefits from a relationship with a charity, exempting the charity from liability for negligence in the performance
of charitable acts).
67. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (labeling the relationship of physician to hospital as one of an
"independent contractor").
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Although the doctrine originally applied only to charitable care,68 it was
eventually extended to protect hospitals from liability even in cases brought by
"paying patient[s]. ' 69 In its heyday, the doctrine was available in cases that would,
in modem times, shock the conscience. 0
Charitable immunity, as applied in the United States, was based on a juris-
prudential mistake.7 It was first used in McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital72 where the court reasoned that the public and private donations used to
support the hospital created a charitable trust fund which could not be diverted to
pay obligations to plaintiffs.73 The McDonald court based its decision on an English
case, Holliday v. St. Leonard's,74 which itself took the doctrine from dictum of an
earlier English case.75 Neither the Holliday nor the McDonald courts realized that
the dictum from the earlier case had been expressly overruled. 76 Regardless of the
oversight, the McDonald case was the catalyst for a long period of hospital
immunity.'
68. See Powers v. Mass. Homoeopathic Hosp., 109 F. 294, 296 (1st Cir. 1901) (noting that in traditional
cases involving the maxim of respondeat superior, a necessary element of the claim was that the master turned a
profit, and concluding that since charitable hospitals provided the services of their doctors for free, no claim against
the charitable institution could be brought).
69. Id. at 295; see id. (explaining that although plaintiff's counsel attempted to distinguish her case from
prior cases on the ground that plaintiff did pay the hospital for her care, the court found the difference to be
immaterial).
70. See, e.g., Evans v. Lawrence &Mem'l Associated Hosp., Inc., 50 A.2d443, 445 (Conn. 1946) (applying
the doctrine of charitable immunity in a case where the plaintiff's infant child was killed when a hospital handyman,
assigned to assist in the pharmacy, filled six baby bottles with boric acid rather than the dextrose solution typically
used for feeding).
71. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 6-7 (N.Y. 1957) (outlining the mistaken use of the doctrine by
English and American courts).
72. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
73. See McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436 (reasoning that the trust could not be held liable without a finding of
negligence on the part of the hospital in its role as administrator of the trust); Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 5 (explaining that
the McDonald decision was premised on faulty reasoning).
74. 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
75. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 5 (explaining the historical misuse of the charitable immunity doctrine and
citing Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839) as the first English case to use the doctrine of charitable
immunity).
76. See Mersey Docks and Harbour Bd. Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L.Cas. 686 (1866) (overruling Duncan);
see also Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 5 (pointing out the fact that by the time the McDonald case was decided, the Holliday
decision had already been reversed).
77. The doctrine of charitable immunity has been used to shield a hospital from malpractice liability as
recently as this decade. See, ag., Bagley v. Fulton-DeKab Hosp. Auth., 455 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Ga. 1995) (retaining
the doctrine of charitable immunity for hospitals when the patient actually receives charity care and noting that
while plaintiff did pay $2.00 for the services she received at the defendant hospital, the actual value of those
services was over $20,000).
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B. The Immunity Begins to Erode
Then-Judge Cardozo set the stage for the erosion of the charitable immunity
doctrine in a case that, ironically, used the doctrine to shield a hospital from
liability.7 In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, Judge Cardozo dis-
tinguished between acts of a hospital staff which were medical and those which
were administrative.79 According to Schloendorff, hospitals would continue to enjoy
immunity from liability only for medical acts.80 Judge Cardozo's rationale for this
distinction was that acts performed by doctors and nurses were professional acts not
subject to control by a hospital administration." Courts struggled with the dis-
tinction, and as case law developed, confusion grew deeper.
8 2
The distinction was eventually abandoned, as illustrated in Bing v. Thunig.
83
The court in Bing abandoned more than the mere medical/administrative rule,
however. It also criticized both arguments justifying charitable immunity. While
recognizing the importance of charitable hospitals, the court noted that modem
hospitals were run like businesses and were less likely to be destroyed by lawsuits
than were their predecessors.84 The court also rejected the rationale that there was
no master-servant relationship between the institutions and the physicians who
practiced there. 5 This rationale had been premised on the fact that hospitals had no
ability to control the high level of professional skill exercised by physicians in
carrying out their duties.86 The Bing court questioned that premise, noting that em-
ployers of other highly skilled professionals did not enjoy a similar immunity.
7
78. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 92 (applying the charitable immunity doctrine to bar a suit by a plaintiff
who had been operated on without her consent).
79. See id. at 94-95 (explaining the necessity of the medical/administrative distinction).
80. See id. at 95 (abandoning the doctrine of charitable immunity in cases where administrative acts of the
hospital staff resulted in patient injury).
81. See id. at 94 (asserting that a hospital could not control the professional acts of doctors and extending
charitable immunity to the medical acts of nurses because such acts were necessarily performed under the direction
of a physician).
82. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 4-5 (outlining the confusing holdings in this area). For example, Iacono v. New
York Polyclinic Med. Sch. & Hosp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (1945), held that placing an improperly capped hot
water bottle onto a patient was administrative. Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 75
N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (1947), on the other hand, held that keeping a hot water bottle on a patient for too long a period
was medical. The case of Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 61 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1946), held that giving a blood
transfusion to the wrong patient was administrative, while Berg v. New York Soc. for Relief of the Ruptured &
Crippled, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (1956), held that it was a medical mistake to give the wrong blood to the right
patient.
83. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 5.
84. See id. at 7 (explaining that although hospitals were rightfully concerned that a negligence judgment
against them would discourage donations and thus limit the facility's ability to serve, such concerns were no longer
legitimate in modem society).
85. See id. at 6 (expressing disagreement with this line of reasoning).
86. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 94 (asserting that a hospital has no control over the professional services
rendered by a physician).
87. See Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 6 (questioning why hospitals should enjoy immunity from vicarious liability
when employers of other skilled professionals, such as engineers and airline pilots, do not).
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The court abandoned the doctrine of charitable immunity for hospitals and
adopted instead a traditional test of respondeat superior when determining a
hospital's liability for physician negligence.88 Thus, the court joined a growing
number of jurisdictions that were embracing the respondeat superior test.89
C. The Protection of Independent Contractor Relationships with Physicians
The demise of the doctrine of charitable immunity left courts with the problem
of determining under what circumstances hospitals could be liable for staff-
physician malpractice.90 To avoid liability, hospitals began to enter into independent
contractor arrangements with their medical staff.91 These contracts expressly stated
the existence of the independent contractor relationship.92 Doctors under such con-
tracts were not paid an annual salary.93 Nor did the hospitals exercise any control
over the manner in which they exercised their professional services.
94
Some courts, perhaps hesitant to compel hospitals to take on liability for their
physicians, found independent contractor relationships where none existed.95 For
example, in Brown v. Moore96 the court refused to hold the owners of a hospital
liable for the negligence of a physician despite the fact that the physician was a
salaried employee of the hospital. 97 The court in Brown focused solely on the fact
88. Id. at 8 (declaring, "[T]he test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or profit-making, as
it is for every other employer, was the person who committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its
employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his employment.").
89. See generally Dumey v. St. Francis Hosp., 83 A.2d 753 (Del. 1951) (abandoning the charitable
immunity doctrine in the state of Delaware); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deanconess Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1946)
(disallowing a hospital to be protected by the charitable immunity doctrine in a libel case); Avellone v. St. John's
Hosp., 135 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1956) (abolishing the doctrine of charitable immunity for hospitals in the state of
Ohio); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 70 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1950) (rejecting the doctrine in the state of Vermont).
90. See Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ohio 1994) (acknowledging
the dilemma Ohio courts faced after abolishing the charitable immunity doctrine).
91. See Ingram, supra note 64, at 223 (pointing out the fact that the contracts were entered so that patients
who were previously treated by salaried employees would not have the same opportunities to sue hospitals for
physician malpractice); see also Priestly, supra note 62. at 264 (acknowledging that the independent contracts were
"clearly a sham to avoid liability"); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that under general
principles of tort law, employers of independent contractors cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the acts
committed by the independent contractors).
92. See Priestly, supra note 62, at 264 (recognizing the explicit terms of the contracts).
93. See id. (asserting that doctors were not paid on a salaried basis since that form of payment was indicative
of an employment relationship).
94. See id. (noting that by distancing itself from control of a doctor's professional services a hospital was
lessening the chances of a court finding an ostensible agency relationship).
95. See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 143 F Supp. 816 (W.D. Pa. 1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1957)
(finding an independent contractor relationship between a hospital and physician where no such contract had been
entered).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 819 (placing importance on the fact that "[the doctor] was paid an annual salary, subject to
the usual withholding deductions").
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that the hospital did not control how the physician carried out his professional
services."
Later courts devised tests to determine whether the independent contractor
status of a physician could be imposed to shield hospitals from liability for mal-
practice.99 According to one court, an independent contractor relationship existed
whenever a patient was admitted to the hospital by his own doctor."° On the other
hand, if a patient was admitted to a hospital through the emergency room, with no
choice as to treating physician, the physician would be regarded as a servant or
agent of the hospital and typical respondeat superior principles would apply.1
01
Such distinctions were short-lived, however, because courts began to impose
liability on hospitals for physician malpractice regardless of the employment status
of doctors.'t2
D. Hospital Liability Despite Independent Contractor Relationships
Just as public policy eroded the charitable immunity doctrine,'0 3 public policy
later disallowed independent contractor relationships to shield hospitals from
liability for physician malpractice.'4 Although clearly contrary to general principles
98. See id. at 821 (asserting that by hiring a doctor, the hospital was not attempting to heal patients itself,
but rather was providing patients with a professional who had the sole responsibility of supplying medical care),
It should be noted that this line of reasoning would almost certainly have failed to satisfy the Bing court. Having
drawn a parallel between physicians and airline pilots, the Bing court recognized that neither group's professional
activities were actually controlled by their employers. Despite that fact, airline companies were never granted
blanket immunity from vicarious liability claims. Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 6.
99. See, e.g., Vanman v. Milford Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 262 A.2d 263,265 (Del. 1970), rev'd, 272 A.2d 718
(Del. 1970) (devising a test which imposed independent contractor relationships on physicians based on the status
of the patient).
100. See id. (stating that under these circumstances, the doctor is merely considered a member of the "staff"
of the hospital and the hospital would not be liable for his or her negligence).
101. See id. L.S. Rogers states: "Such a physician usually stands in a position with respect to the hospital
which, under the normal tests of the existence of the master-servant relationship, would call for a ruling that he was
the hospital's servant. In other words, such a doctor is normally paid a salary by the hospital... ." Id. (quoting L.S.
Rogers, Annotation, Liability of a Hospital or Sanitarium for Negligence of a Physician or Surgeon, 69 A.L.R.2D
305,309 (1960).
102. See infra Part I1.D (explaining how hospitals came to be liable for the physician malpractice despite the
independent contractor relationships they established with doctors).
103. See infra Parts IB - D (outlining the reasons courts gave for the demise of hospital immunity from
liability).
104. The Martell court declared: "iT]he question... is just as clearly a public policy question .... The issue
of hospital liability is simply taken one step farther when the question is whether the hospital may be held liable
for the acts of physicians in the hospital's emergency room when the physicians are independent contractors rather
than employees." Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 349-50 (1987).
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of tort law,"" by the 1980s hospitals could be held liable for physician malpractice
irrespective of the contractual relationship between the parties.'06
Courts were able to achieve these results by applying another doctrine of tort
law commonly referred to as the ostensible agency theory.'0 7 The most frequently
cited explanation of this theory is found in the Second Restatement of Torts, section
429 which reads:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in rendering such
services, to the same extent as though the employee were supplying them
himself or by his servants.08
105. See McDonough v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa. 1974) (recognizing the general rule that
employers are not liable for torts committed by independent contractors).
106. See Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279, 283 (Okla. 1983) (holding that a hospital could not
deny responsibility for the malpractice of emergency room physicians based on their independent contractor status);
Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 637 P.2d 155, 159 (Or. 1981) (denying the defendant hospital's motion
for summary judgment where a material issue of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held its physicians out
as employees of the hospital); Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio 1980) (holding that a
hospital could not avoid liability for physician malpractice despite the independent contractor status of staff
physicians); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 974 (Wash. 1978) (recognizing that, "The experience
of the courts has been that the application of hombook rules of agency to the hospital-physician relationship usually
leads to unrealistic and unsatisfactory results, at least from the standpoint of the injured patient."). For a more
complete listing of the jurisdictions abandoning the independent contractor basis for hospital immunity from
liability, see Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 350 (1987).
107. Gregory T. Perkes, Casenote, Medical Malpractice-Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence-
Hospital Liability May be Based on Either Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Doctrine of Corporate Negligence,
17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 558, 560-63 (1986) (acknowledging the way courts have used the doctrine of ostensible
agency).
108. REsTATENiENT(SECOND)oFToRTs §429 (1965). It should be noted that a second theory frequently cited
as a basis for finding hospital liability for the negligence of physicians, agency by estoppel, will not be discussed
in this Comment. This theory, found in § 267 of the Second Restatement of Agency, differs from the ostensible
agency theory in that the former requires the plaintiff's reliance on representations as to employment made by the
principal. See RESTATimENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957); see, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1380
(Alaska 1987) (discussing the differences between agency by estoppel and ostensible agency). The two theories
have often been cited by courts in the same breath and have, in that context, been frequently misapplied. Id.
Additionally, some courts have questioned the extent to which any patient in a hospital even cares about the
employment status of the treating physician, let alone relies on such status. See also Capan v. Divine Providence
Hosp., 430 A.2d 647,649 (Pa. 1980) (asserting that "[ilt would be absurd to require... a patient to be familiar with
the law of respondeat superior and so to inquire of each person who treated him whether he is an employee of the
hospital or an independent contractor.").
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Under this theory, even a doctor who is an independent contractor is nonetheless,
"an agent of the hospital with respect to the patient."' 9 Many justifications have
been given for this treatment,"0 but two may apply in the HMO context.111
The first justification for holding a hospital liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor physician is based on two policy rationales that focus on the
way a patient views the delivery of health care. First, patients are more likely to
choose a particular hospital than an individual physician when seeking acute
medical care."t2 Thus, it would be unjust to deny patients a remedy for any harm
incurred at a facility chosen as best capable to address particular needs. Some courts
have noted the inequity in allowing a secret contract between a hospital and a
physician to bind patients who are not privy to that contract.' The patients' lack
of knowledge as to their doctor's contractual status justifies a finding of ostensible
agency even where the hospital had no right to control the physician's actions." 4
The second justification, found in section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,1' 5 allows the court to find an ostensible agency relationship whenever the
hospital has held itself out as being the employer of its staff physicians., 6 A
hospital holds itself out as such "when the hospital acts or omits to act in some way
which leads the patient to a reasonable belief he is being treated by the hospital or
one of its employees."'
' 7
109. Capan, 430 A.2d at 649.
110. See MehIman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Md. 1977) (deciding that the patient's reliance on the
hospital for care and the fact that there was no indication that the treating physician was not an employee were
significant facts in rejecting the hospital's claim of immunity); see also Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Hosp., 273 N.W2d
429 (Mich. 1978) (finding the patient's expectations and the fact that no notice was given of the hospital-physician
relationship important).
111. See infra notes 189-233 and accompanying text (applying thejustification used to hold hospitals liable
for the malpractice of independent contractor physicians to the HMO context).
112. See Capan, 430 A.2d at 649 (noting that patients often enter such facilities seeking a variety of
professional medical services rather than the attention of a single doctor).
113. See id. (citing Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1976), for the proposition that it
is unfair to bind patients to contracts of which they are unaware).
114. An employer's ability to control the actions of an independent contractor is a very significant factor in
most ostensible agency contexts. See John Dwight Ingram. Vicarious Liability of an Employer-Master: Must There
Be a Right of Control?, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 93, 110 (1995) (proclaiming that where an employer has a right to
control an employee's activities, most courts are willing to impose vicarious liability on the former). However, the
Hardy court stated:
[The hospital] places physicians in a position where they serve and treat members of the general public,
persons who undoubtedly have no knowledge of the hospital's lack of authority to control. If persons
in this context seek and accept [the hospital's] services, we regard that it would be unjust to allow [the
hospital] to contract away liability for the negligence of its physicians, particularly where such an
agreement is beyond the knowledge or perception of the patient.
Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 372 (Miss. 1985).
115. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTor § 429 (1965)).
116. See Capan, 430 A.2d at 649 (recognizing that one factor justifying a finding of an ostensible agency
relationship is a hospital's "holding out" of a physician as its own employee).
117. Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970,979 (Wash. 1978).
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An ostensible agency relationship exists if the patient has a reasonable belief
that the physician is employed by the hospital. 8 A reasonable belief can be the
product of the way the hospital presented itself in its advertising."19 Courts were
hesitant to allow hospitals to avoid liability once they had competed for the
patient's business through advertising. ° Especially significant to courts were
advertisements that promoted the hospital as providing "skilled professionals" or
a "full service facility."' 2' Hospitals could not distance themselves from the acts of
physicians whose expertise the institutions had touted in an effort to get patients in
the door.
22
Societal changes and public policy often compel abandonment of long-standing
legal principles. Perhaps no industry has undergone as significant a shift in potential
liability as the hospital industry. Once shielded from liability by the charitable
immunity doctrine, the industry now finds itself accountable for the negligence of
physicians with whom it has carefully contracted for the purpose of avoiding
liability. This transition was based on sound policy and should be used by courts to
increase the accountability of HMOs for physician malpractice.
I. THE ADVENT OF HMO LIABILrrY FOR THE MALPRACTICE OF PLAN
PHYSICIANS
The erosion of hospital immunity from liability was a necessary response to
changing conditions in the area of health care.' 3 As more patients looked to hos-
pitals rather than individual physicians for health care, courts found it unjust to
allow hospitals to contract their way out of liability.'2 4 Today, Americans increa-
singly rely on HMOs for their overall health care.' 25 As more Americans fall under
118. See Priestly supra note 62, at265 (distinguishing the showing of reasonable belief necessary for a court
to find an ostensible agency relationship from the more stringent requirement of affirmative reliance when the
doctrine of agency by estoppel is applied).
119. See id. (noting that advertisements are important in both the ostensible agency and agency by estoppel
contexts).
120. See Hardy, 471 So.2d at 371 (recognizing the inequity in the way hospitals advertised the quality of their
physicians and then denied any relationship to them when it came to liability for their malpractice).
121. See Priestly, supra note 62, at 265 (noting the importance courts placed on such advertisements).
122. See id. (explaining that courts thought it would be inequitable to allow hospitals to escape liability for
physician malpractice when they obtained a benefit by featuring the skill of the physicians in advertising).
123. See supra Part I1.B - D (outlining the decline in hospital immunity from vicarious liability for physician
malpractice).
124. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (explaining the fact that more people were looking to
individual hospitals rather than individual physicians as one basis for disallowing hospitals to shield themselves
through independent contracting with physicians).
125. See David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds OverManaged Care: Frustrated Consumers Pushfor Tougher
Laws, WASH. PosT, June 30,1997, at Al (acknowledging the continuously growing number of Americans who rely
on HMOs for their health care).
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the managed care umbrella, 26 it becomes evident that it is unfair to shield this
enormous industry from accountability to its customers.
Courts are again faced with an industry of health care giants which have
enjoyed a long period of immunity from liability and which now seek to avoid a
new-found theory of liability for physician malpractice. 7 Specifically, courts are
again faced with entities attempting to avoid vicarious liability claims through
independent contractor relationships with physicians. 128 Just as these contractual
arrangements failed to protect hospitals from liability for physician malpractice,1
2 9
so should they fail to protect HMOs."3 ° There is a lesson to be learned here, the
challenge is to find it.
A. A Liability Shield for HMOs: ERISA
The expansive growth in the managed care industry brought with it a pre-
dictable surge of lawsuits against HMOs.' Like hospitals, these entities were
shielded from liability." 2 However, in this instance, immunity came not from the
common law, but from ERISA.
3
The relevant provision of ERISA in the context of claims against HMOs states
that "the provisions of this subchapter.., shall supersede any and all laws insofar
as they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan."' This pro-
vision has preempted many actions brought against HMOs, including state law
126. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (illustrating the tremendous growth in recent years of the
managed care industry in the United States)..
127. See infra Parts ITI.A - IV and accompanying text (pondering the issue of HMO liability for physician
malpractice).
128. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (illustrating that the managed care industry has taken
great strides to enter into independent contractor relationships with physicians).
129. See supra Part II.D (explaining how hospitals came to be vicariously liable for physician malpractice
despite their efforts to shield themselves through independent contractor relationships with physicians).
130. See infra Parts m.C - IV and accompanying notes (arguing that HMOs should not be able to avoid
vicarious liability for physician malpractice through independent contracting with plan physicians).
131. See Rodd Zolkos, As Managed Care Expands, Liability Exposures Also Grow, BUS. INS., July 29, 1996,
at 3 (stating that "[a]s managed care grows, related liability exposures are growing...."); see also Joe Neidzielsk,
Shift to Managed Care Creating New Exposures, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH, FIN. SERVICES EDITION,
Oct. 7, 1996, at 5 (recognizing that the more people who are covered under managed care plans, the more such
plans will be subject to lawsuits).
132. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text (examining how ERISA has worked as a liability shield
for HMOs).
133. See infranotes 134-44 and accompanying text (discussing the immunity from liability enjoyed by HMOs
under ERISA).
134. ERISA § 514(a) (Vest 1997); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985).
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actions for vicarious liability.1 35 HMOs have worn this language like a badge, using
it to tout their immunity from suit.
1 36
Whereas charitable immunity was largely based upon jurisprudential mistake,137
the provisions of ERISA that shield HMOs from liability were the result of legis-
lative oversight. When ERISA was enacted in 1974, HMOs were no where near the
force in health care that they are today.1 38 ERISA was enacted to create uniform
pension laws among the states and to protect employees from employers who might
be unwilling to disperse benefits.139 It is unlikely Congress imagined that by
immunizing HMOs from liability they would hurt employees who were left without
redress for the wrongs of managed care entities.' 40
Federal officials have recognized irony in the fact that this legislation, intended
to protect workers, now fails to protect them from malpractice.1 4' Even some
managed care executives have admitted that the protection is beyond Congressional
intent.142 Although many are calling for Congressional reform of the Act,143 courts
and lawyers have found ways around ERISA's broad protections'44
135. See, e.g., Schwartz v. FHP Int'l Corp.. 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Ariz. 1996) (holding that plaintiff's
claims for vicarious liability against the defendant HMO "related to" the administration of health plan benefits and
thus were preempted by ERISA).
136. See Robert Pear, HMOs Reject Malpractice Liability, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996, at 1 (stating that
"[h]ealth maintenance organizations ... are telling courts across the country that they cannot be held responsible
for medical malpractice in cases involving patients who receive care through an employee-sponsored health plan"
and quoting G. William Scott, a senior attorney in the United States Labor Department, as stating "[this is the
defense that HMOs are raising for everything now. Whenever they are sued, they say, 'We have no liability because
we were administering an employee benefit plan."').
137. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (explaining why the doctrine of charitable immunity was
a mistaken doctrine).
138. See Harshbarger, supra note 2, at 218 (explaining that when Congress was debating ERISA in 1972,
there were fewer than 40 HMOs in existence in the United States, as opposed to over 600 by the mid-1990's).
139. See Stuart Auerback, Law Guarding HMOs from Suit Challenged: Patients Find Doctors Easierto Sue,
WASH. POsT, Dec. 17, 1996, at Z8 (noting that while ERISA has served its purpose in protecting pension plans, it
has not been very effective in regulating health plans).
140. See Harshbarger, supra note 2, at 218 (addressing the fact that HMOs were a rare entity at the time
ERISA was enacted and suggesting that Congress could not have predicted how popular they would become).
141. See Pear, supra note 136, at I (acknowledging the Labor Department's dissatisfaction with the current
state of the law and noting that in the past few years, the federal government has filed amicus curiae briefs in at
least six malpractice actions against managed care organizations).
142. See Auerback, Law Guarding HMOs, supra note 139, at Z8 (quoting Arthur Rosenfeld, Vice President
and Regional Counsel for Kaiser in Oakland, as saying, "I don't think Congress ever intended [ERISA] to be as
broad as the courts have interpreted it.").
143. See id. (citing Labor Secretary Robert Reich as saying that ERISA should be changed to allow patients
to sue HMOs). In his most recent State of the Union Address, President Clinton noted the large number of
Americans covered by HMO plans, and called for reform in numerous areas under a proposed Consumers Bill of
Rights. See President William J. Clinton, State of the Union (visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/
WH/SOTU98/address.html>.
144. See HMO Vicarious Liability Claims, MANAGED CARE WK., Oct. 30, 1995, available in 1995
WL2409211 (stating that, "[c]ourts are increasingly less disposed to apply the Employee Income Security Act's
(ERISA) broad preemptive powers").
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B. How ERISA Preemption Works
The typical malpractice suit against an HMO is brought by a plaintiff claiming
that the entity is vicariously liable for the negligence of a plan physician. 45 Since
these suits are usually brought in state court, the HMO files for removal to federal
court.146 In response to most plaintiffs' argument that a claim of vicarious liability
is a state law claim, HMOs argue that although the plaintiff's claim may not raise
a federal issue on its face as required by Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust,'47 suits against HMOs administering employee benefits
fall underthe "complete preemption" doctrine.t 41This doctrine recognizes that Con-
gress has preempted an area of law so completely that any action arising within its
scope is automatically considered federal in nature.'49 "The Supreme Court has
ruled that ERISA is such an area, and that state law claims are preempted by ERISA
provided they 'relate to' an ERISA plan.'
50
When the case is removed to federal court, the HMO will move to dismiss,
arguing again that ERISA preempts the action.'5' This preemption argument is pre-
mised on ERISA section 514(a), t52 which states, "the provisions of this subchapter
... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan ... ."'53 The Supreme Court has extended the
scope of this provision by holding that it may be used to preempt both state
statutory and common-law claims as long as they "relate to" an employee benefit
plan.
t54
145. See, e.g., Butler v. Wt, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D.NJ. 1994) (pertaining to a case wherein an administrator
of patient's estate brought a vicarious liability claim against U.S. Healthcare, Inc., alleging malpractice of a plan
physician).
146. See, e.g., Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-0374P, 1997 WVL 452750 at *1
(N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997) (explaining that the defendant HMO removed the case to federal court on the grounds
that the suit was preempted by ERISA).
147. 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983).
148. See Blum, No. CIV. A. 3:97-CV-0374P, 1997 WL 452750 at *1 (discussing the complete preemption
doctrine).
149. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) (acknowledging Congress' power
to legislate an area of the law so completely as to make any claim arising in that area an issue solely for the federal
courts to decide).
150. Blum, No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-0374P, at *1 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987)).
151. See, eg., Ricci v. Gooberman, 840F. Supp. 316,316-18 (D.NJ. 1993) (discussing the defendantHMO's
motion to dismiss under ERISA § 514(a)).
152. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1997).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (extending ERISA's preemptive power to
cover state common-law claims that relate to employee benefit plans).
340
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A court must then determine whether a vicarious liability claim sufficiently
"relates to" an employee benefit plan to warrant preemption. 155 The potential
breadth of such language makes the test difficult to apply.1 56 However, the Supreme
Court offered some guidance in this area when it clarified that a state law "relate[s]
to" an employee benefit plan when "it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan.'
s 7
For some courts, vicarious liability claims fell naturally within this language.1
5 8
One court reasoned that since the outcome of plaintiff's claim ultimately rested on
the relationship between the physician and the HMO, the action certainly "related
to" the benefit plan and was thus, preempted.159 That court found that allowing such
claims would ultimately hurt the consumer since health care costs would surely rise
if both the physician and the HMO were required to carry malpractice insurance.1 60
Another court found a vicarious liability claim to "relate to" an employee benefit
plan because any malpractice claim against an HMO would necessarily involve an
inquiry into whether agents of the HMO lived up to the promises of quality offered
by the entity.61 Thus, ERISA appeared to protect HMOs from claims of vicarious
liability for physician malpractice.
C. The Immunity Begins to Erode
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the widespread implications of
ERISA section 514(a)'s "relate to" provision,162 it has also indicated that the section
has limits. 61 Unfortunately, the Court has not adequately defined those limits,
leaving the task in the hands of lower federal courts.16 The delegation of this duty
155. See Ricci, 840 F Supp. at 317 (stating that "[t]he applicability of ERISA preemption in this case thus
turns on whether a state tort claim premised on a vicarious liability theory 'relates to' U.S. Healthcare's employee
benefit plan").
156. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (noting that "[ERISA's] preemption clause is
conspicuous for its breadth").
157. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
158. See, e.g., Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 317 (finding plaintiffs vicarious liability claim against the defendant
HMO to relate to plaintiff's employee benefit plan).
159. See id. (alluding that, absent the preemption issue, no remedy is available against the HMO if the
physician was an independent contractor, while the plaintiff might be able to recover if it could be shown the
physician was an employee of the managed care entity).
160. See id. (noting that in using this reasoning, the court was persuaded by the defendant HMO's brief).
161. See Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1994, rev'd 57 F3d
350 (3d Cir. 1995)) (holding that plaintiffs vicarious liability claim did relate to the employee benefit plan since
it would force the court to look at the terms of the health plan); see also Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp.
1097, 1102 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (following the reasoning of the Dukes court).
162. See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58 (recognizing the enormous breadth of the "relate to" provision).
163. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (recognizing that "[soime state actions may affect employee benefit
plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan").
164. Id. (stating that "[wie express no views about where it would be appropriate to draw the line.").
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has led to the creation of a subtle distinction, much like the one used in the hospital
context. 165
Lower federal courts have developed a distinction that does not guarantee a
successful lawsuit for plaintiffs, but does allow plaintiffs to have their claims
remanded for trial in the state courts.6t Plaintiffs prefer state courts to federal courts
because state juries are thought to be more sympathetic to individuals and less
sympathetic to corporate defendants.' 67 This is especially true in the context of
ERISA litigation.
68
Prihoda v. Shpritz69 illustrates the distinction that may allow plaintiffs a state
forum. In remanding plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against an HMO, the court
first relied on ERISA section 502(1)(B), 70 ERISA's "civil enforcement provi-
sion."'' This provision outlines three situations in which a plaintiff can sue an
HMO: "[T]o recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.' 72 The court noted that this provision is the one which actually
allows defendants to remove a case to federal court under the complete preemption
doctrine. 17 The court then explained that ERISA section 514(a) creates "conflict
preemption" which does not create federal jurisdiction. 7 4 Rather, "conflict pre-
emption" serves merely as a defense to a plaintiff's claim arising under ERISA."5
165. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction which has evolved in the
hospital liability context).
166. See, e.g., Yanez v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting plaintiff's
motion to remand vicarious liability claims against the HMO back to state court despite ERISA).
167. See Paul M. Barrett, Justices Expand Certain Authority of Federal Judges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1992,
at B8 (noting that because of the sympathy plaintiffs receive in state courts, corporate defendants usually prefer to
have their cases tried in federal courts); see also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal
Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369,443 (1992) (suggesting several
reasons why plaintiff's attorneys prefer the state court forum; among those reasons are the less restrictive procedural
rules of state courts and a notion that federal judges are more arrogant than their state counterparts).
168. See Charles P. Efflandt, An Overview of Civil Litigation Under ERISA, 59 J. KAN. B.A. 24,28 (1990)
(explaining the reasons that ERISA plaintiffs enjoy state forums as "familiarity with the court, a more expeditious
resolution of the dispute, and the hope that a state court's sympathies will lie more with the plaintiff insofar as
ERISA's technical issues and defenses are concerned"); see also Rodd Zolkos, As Managed Care Expands Liability
Exposures Also Grow, Bus. INs., July 29, 1996, at 3 (asserting that plaintiffs are purposefully drafting their
vicarious liability claims against HMOs in such a manner that the claims will remain in state court since that forum
typically results in larger jury awards).
169. 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md. 1996).
170. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1 132(a)(l)(B) (West 1997).
171. Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 117 (D. Md. 1996).
172. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 1997).
173. Prihoda, 914 F. Supp. at 117 (explaining that suits brought in state courts under this provision are
"recharacterized" as federal and are thus, completely preempted).
174. Id. (citing the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,398 (1987), as saying, "The
fact that a defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims are pre-empted does not establish that they are
removable to federal court.").
175. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995) (illustrating the differences between complete
preemption and conflict preemption).
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From this, the court reasoned that if a plaintiffs suit against an HMO related
to the "quantity" of benefits conferred under the plan, it fell under ERISA's civil
enforcement provision and was preempted. 76 A suit related to the "quality" of
benefits did not fall under ERISA section 502 and could not be removed to federal
court.177 Using this reasoning, many courts have remanded vicarious liability claims
against HMOs where the claims are concerned with the quality of benefits received
under an employee benefit plan.
178
Much like the medical/administrative distinction that arose in the hospital
liability context,1 79 this distinction is already being criticized for its difficulty in
application.180 At least one court has recognized that a claim relating to a decision
to deny benefits under a health plan (raising an issue of the quantity of benefits)
may ultimately relate to the quality of care provided. 81 This distinction may give
way to a bright line rule allowing these suits to proceed in state court. Courts have
already put forth policy rationales that would seem to justify such a shift. 82
D. Independent Contractor Relationships Between Physicians & HMOs
Because state courts are typically more favorable to individual plaintiffs who
take on corporate giants like HMOs, 83 the managed care industry has devised stra-
tegies for avoiding liability in this hostile setting. For example, HMOs have been
176. Prihoda, 914 F. Supp. at 118.
177. See id. (finding that plaintiff's claims concerned the quality of benefits and holding that plaintiff's
motion to remand should thus be granted).
178. See Dykema v. King, 959 F. Supp. 736 (D.S.C. 1997) (deciding plaintiff's vicarious liability claim
related to the quality of benefits received under the health plan); Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. CIV.A.
95-7816, 1996 WL 220979, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996) (agreeing with plaintiffs that their vicarious liability
claims related to the quality of the benefits received); Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75 (D.C. 1996)
(distinguishing plaintiff's vicarious liability claim from cases where the clain was held to relate to the quantity of
benefits by noting that plaintiff's claim stemmed from negligence while the latter stemmed from administrative
decisions).
179. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing the medical/administrative distinction which
evolved in the hospital liability context).
180. See Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing
the potential ambiguity in the quantity/quality distinction).
181. See id. (warning that the quality/quantity distinction must be used carefully because decisions regarding
whether to treat may have an effect on the quality of care provided under a plan).
182. See Edelen, 943 F. Supp. at 77 (answering defendant's argument that malpractice claims against HMOs
should be preempted by saying,
Under defendant's theory, every medical malpractice claim would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal district courts because of the ERISA preemption clause, so long as the defendant doctor
was employed by an HMO. In light of the burgeoning HMO industry and the legions of potential HMO-
related medical malpractice claims that can be brought by innumerable HMO participants, this Court
... is reluctant to accept such an argument, and a fair reading of ERISA does not permit it).
183. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (explaining that state courts are typically more favorable
to individual plaintiffs than corporate entities).
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urged to enter into independent contractor relationships with plan physicians. Not
surprisingly, the Independent Practice Association model of HMOs, in which all
physicians within the plan are independent contractors, has become the most
popular HMO model in the United States.1
85
Case law has not settled the issue of whether managed care entities can be held
vicariously liable for the malpractice of independent contractor physicians. 8 6 State
courts that have actually reached the merits in these cases are split on how to
approach the issue. 187 A look to the past might be instructive.
The policies that led to abandonment of hospital immunity from liability despite
the independent contractor status of physicians 88 apply nicely to the HMO con-
text. 89 Courts should focus on two rationales which were used previously: the
patient's choice of the institution rather than a particular physician,' 9 and the in-
stitution's practice of "holding out" the physician as an employee.' 9 '
1. Choice of Entity
By the late 1970's and early 1980's, hospitals could no longer shield themselves
from vicarious liability claims by entering into independent contractor relationships
184. See How to Negotiate Contracts, supra note 10, at 1056 (asserting that, "Managed care plans can guard
against vicarious liability by including in provider contracts a simple clause that explicitly says providers are
independent contractors, not employees"); see also Neidzielski, supra note 131, at 5 (suggesting that to avoid
liability for malpractice, HMOs should try to distance themselves from doctors and explaining that independent
contractor relationships with physicians give the entities a strong chance of avoiding vicarious liability claims).
185. See THE ABCS OF HMOs, supra note 3, at 36 (noting the popularity of the Independent Practice
Association model and comparing it to other models, including the "Staff Model" in which physicians arc actual
employees of the HMO, the "Group Model" in which doctors are organized into large practice groups in centralized
locations, and the "Network Model" which is similar to the "Group Model" except that there are more multiple-
doctor locations available).
186. See, e.g., Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc. 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (11. 1992) (noting that the court was unaware
of any cases actually holding an HMO liable for medical malpractice).
187. See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. 1988) (applying the rationale used
in a case holding that a hospital could be vicariously liable for the malpractice of an independent contractor
physician to the HMO context and remanding to the trial court since a material issue of fact existed as to whether
the physician in this case was an ostensible agent of the HMO). But see, Raglin, 595 N.E.2d at 158 (focusing on
the fact that the HMO retained no right to control physicians within its network in refusing to hold an HMO
vicariously liable for the malpractice of a physician).
188. See supra Part ll.D (illustrating how courts decided that hospitals could not protect themselves from
vicarious liability claims through independent contracting with physicians).
189. See, e.g., Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1234 (explaining that one reason why hospitals could not protect themselves
from malpractice liability through independent contractor relationships with physicians was that patients had begun
to look to the hospitals rather than to individual physicians for their care and noting that the same rationale is
applicable in the HMO context).
190. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (acknowledging that courtsjustified their refusal to allow
hospitals to protect themselves from vicarious liability claims by reasoning that patients were looking to hospitals
rather than individual physicians for health care).
191. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of "holding out" as it applies
to hospital liability).
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with doctors. 192 Courts placed much emphasis on the fact that people were looking
to hospitals rather than individual physicians for their overall medical care. 93
Because of that, courts thought it was unjust to allow hospitals to secretly contract
their way out of liability. 94
Today many people rely on managed care organizations rather than individual
physicians for their overall health care. 195 In fact, most Americans receive their
health care coverage through an employee benefits plan. 196 Additionally, 73% of
American workers are enrolled in a managed care network.197 And finally, over half
of American workers have no choice as to the managed care plan they use, since
their employers offer coverage under a single plan only.'98 Thus, most people have
a very limited number of doctors from which they can choose and they may not be
able to obtain care from their preferred physician. In short, they look to HMOs to
provide their health care.
Additionally, most HMOs require a referral from a primary care physician or
prior authorization from the managed care organization itself before the HMO will
cover treatment by a specialist.' 99 When a patient is denied the care of a specialist,
she is left in the hands of her primary care physician, who may be ill-equipped to
deal with her special needs.2tu Since the patient is left out of the decision whether
192. See supra Part I.D (discussing how hospitals were denied the ability to shield themselves from vicarious
liability claims through independent contractor associations with physicians).
193. See, e.g., Mehlman v. Powell, 378 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Md. 1977) (placing significance on the fact that
patients tended to rely on hospitals for medical care); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa.
1980) (noting that patients frequently entered hospitals seeking a variety of professional medical services rather than
the attention of an individual doctor).
194. See Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1976) (noting the inequity of allowing an
unknown contract to bind an unsuspecting patient); Capan, 430 A.2d at 649 (following the reasoning of Mduba).
195. See THE ABCs OF HMOs, supra note 3. at 20 (citing the fact that at least 40% of patients who join
HMOs are forced to give up their preferred physician because the doctor is not included as a health care provider
under their plan). Under such circumstances, it is hard to see how a patient can be said to have chosen a particular
doctor.
196. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that most Americans receive their health
care through their employment).
197. See THE ABCs OF HMOs, supra note 3, at 17 (offering various statistics about the prevalence of HMOs
in the United States).
198. See id. at 19 (saying that fewer than 50% of American employers offer their employees more than one
choice of health plans).
199. See Lloyd M. Krieger, Managed Care Hurts Bond of Doctors, Patients, STAR-TRIB. (St. Paul-
Minneapolis), June 6, 1997, at 23A (asserting that while decisions regarding treatment methods previously were
at the discretion of doctors and patients, now all procedures must be negotiated with an HMO before payment
approval is given and noting that without approval from the PacifiCare HMO, patients have to forego needed care
or pay for it themselves); see also Jay Greene, Report Tracks HMOs Service, ORANGE Co. REG., June 20, 1997,
at C1 (citing a recent study showing that the number one complaint of HMO members is their inability to acquire
access to specialists).
200. SeeSpecialReport: Specialists at the Gate, MED. UTILIZATIONMGMT.,Sept. 25,1997, available in 1997
WL 9410746 (suggesting that primary care physicians may not be best able to handle a patients needs). For
example, stroke patients treated by a neurologist had a 36% lower death rate than those treated by a family
practitioner, according to two studies, patients seeking care for heart attacks would have a much lower death rate
if treated by cardiologists rather than family practitioners; and breast cancer patients treated by specialists had a
19981 HMOs Avoiding Malpractice Liability Through Independent Contracting
to see a specialist, it again appears that the patient looks to the HMOs, rather than
an individual physician for health care.
Hospitals could not contract their way out of vicarious liability for physician
malpractice since patients were choosing particular hospitals, rather than individual
physicians, for their overall health care."° This rationale applies with great force in
the HMO context. Patients must look to their managed care companies for initial
treatment and continuing specialty care. Just as it was inequitable for hospitals to
use independent contractor relationships to avoid malpractice liability,202 it is like-
wise inequitable to allow HMOs to avoid liability through clever contracting. Yet
in this setting, the unfairness rests not only on the injured patient, but also on the
primary care physicians who practice outside their area of expertise under incen-
tives from the HMOs.203 Some managed care companies offer primary care
physicians bonuses for limiting a patient's access to care that falls outside the
standard office visit, °4 As one doctor recently said, "Bonuses like this are not only
essentially bribes, they can represent the difference between having an income and
not."'  When a business entity dictates that a doctor's professional judgement be
compromised for the good of that entity, it is unfair to force doctors to shoulder the
entire liability burden.206
2. "Holding Out"
Employers who utilize independent contractors cannot avoid immunity from
liability whenever the services rendered by their independent contractors are
"accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the em-
ployer or his servants. 2°7 Courts relied on the "reasonable belief' language to find
much longer survival rate than their peers who were treated by non-specialists. Id.; see also ANDERS, supra note
4, at 228 (asserting that, "Primary-care doctors don't recognize crucial symptoms").
201. See Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. 1980) (explaining the use of this
rationale).
202. See supra notes 113-14 (discussing that courts felt it was inequitable to allow an undisclosed contract
between a hospital and a physician to bind a patient).
203. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Law and Medicine, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS'N, 1817, 1817 (1996) (lamenting the
inequity of a system that allows doctors to shoulder the entire burden of malpractice suits when decisions not to
treat are secretly influenced by financial incentives).
204. See Easterbrook, supra note 35, at 64 (revealing the way bonus systems are used by HMOs).
205. Id
206. This theory is in line with one of the standard rationales for the vicarious liability doctrine, i.e., the one
who profits from a transaction should bear the risk of loss from that transaction. See also, Ingram, supra note 114,
at 94 (noting that one of the main rationales for the vicarious liability doctrine is that whoever benefits from a given
activity should also bear the burdens that result from it); Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV.
444,455-56 (1923) (listingprofit among the nine traditional rationales forvicarious liability). In this context, HMO.
are profiting greatly from the actions of plan physicians. See American Political Network, Managed Care Monitor
Physicians: One Doctor's Experience With Managed Care, Oct. 6, 1997, at 10 (asserting that profits from health
care are going to HMOs rather than to physicians).
207. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OFTORS § 429 (1965).
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that hospitals held themselves out as employers of independent contractor
physicians in two distinct contexts.208 The first was when a hospital led a patient to
think she was being treated by the hospital staff.2°9 The second was when hospitals'
advertisements led patients to such a belief.2"' Both are applicable in the HMO
context.2tt
It is not hard to find actions by HMOs which lead patients to believe that their
physician is employed by a managed care entity. Doctors will tell you that their
decision-making has been drastically altered by HMOs. 21 2 Medical decisions are
frequently made with the HMO's profit, rather than the individual patient's needs,
in mind.2 3 As'a result, patients are often refused access to care they want and
need.21 4 In many cases, the doctor, not the HMO, must explain denial of treatment
to the patient.2 t5 Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for a patient to believe
that her doctor is working for an HMO.
One court, in refusing to shield a hospital from liability for physician mal-
practice, noted the inequity in expecting a patient to know enough about the law to
ask her treating physician whether she was an employee or independent contractor
208. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (describing how courts interpreted the "reasonable
belief" language).
209. See Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 979 (Wash. 1978) (declaring that whenever a
hospital acts in a manner that creates a reasonable belief in the mind of the patient that an employment relationship
exists, it has held itself out as the employer of the physician).
210. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (explaining how courts looked to a hospital's advertising
to determine if it held itself out as the employer of staff physicians).
211. See infra notes 2 12-34 and accompanying text (applying the reasoning used in the hospital liability cases
to the HMO context).
212. See ANDERS, supra note 4, at 75 (relaying the story of a pediatrician who is very frustrated with the ways
HMOs alter the level of care he would otherwise provide. To illustrate: HMO patients must have blood drawn at
sites other than the pediatrician's office even though his nurses are specially trained to make the experience painless
for his young patrons; he is often told by HMOs that he cannot prescribe necessary drugs because they are too
expensive; and it is almost impossible to get approval for his patients to see a specialist); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 35, at 64 (suggesting that the decision to treat a patient may force a doctor to sacrifice income).
213. See ANDERS, supra note 4. at 77 (noting that in many instances. HMOs have steered patients who needed
heart surgery to clinics which could provide the managed care companies with large discounts, as opposed to
hospitals where the patients would receive superior care and inferring that at least one of the major HMOs has
actually asked its doctors not to request experimental treatment for cancer patients because of cost concerns);
Easterbrook, supra note 35, at 64 (referring to HMO health care as "for-profit medicine"); George J. Church,
Backlash Against HMOs: Doctors, Patients, Unions, Legislators are Fed Up and Say They Won't Take It Anymore,
TIME, Apr. 14, 1997, at 32 (quoting Dr. Alan Fogelman, head of the Department of Medicine at UCLA, who said,
"People who are sick will be allowed to die because it is best economically.").
214. See Mechanic, supra note 8, at 1810 (noting that formulaic decisions about health care made by HMOs
rather than by doctors often fail to take into account the differing needs and preferences of patients).
215. See Lloyd M. Krieger, The HMO (Attrition) Plan: It's Doctors vs. Bureaucracy, L.A. TMES, June 1,
1997, at M2 (explaining that whenever the author (a doctor) recommends a conservative course of treatment, he
is faced with patients who distrust whetherhis decision is based on medical judgment or what the HMO has dictated
as the course of treatment).
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of the hospital. 1 6 When a person needs medical care, the contractual status of her
physician is not foremost in her mind.27 The same rationale applies in the HMO
context. Managed care entities, like hospitals, should not be allowed to shield
themselves from liability by entering into independent contractor relationships with
physicians.
Hospitals were also found to have "held out" physicians as their own employees
through their advertisements.1 Courts reasoned that if hospitals wanted to compete
aggressively for business by touting their skilled medical staff, they could not elude
liability by denying a relationship between themselves and staff physicians.
219
Especially persuasive to the courts were advertisements that publicized the
institutions as providing "skilled professionals" or a "full service facility.
' 220
Advertisements can leave consumers with a reasonable belief that the advertising
entity has some control over what occurs within its walls.
22'
HMOs aggressively advertise for the business of health care consumers.222 For
example, one managed care company asserts that it can provide, "extensive
network[s] of ... physicians... all working together to bring you quality health
care."22 Another promises that it has made a commitment to the health of the
communities it serves and that it achieves this through offering "effective
partnerships with providers. 224 Yet another is simply called, "MD Health Plan."225
216. See Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. 1980) (declaring that "[lit would be
absurd to require... a patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat superior and to inquire of each person who
treated him whether he is an employee of the hospital or an independent contractor.").
217. See Ingram, supra note 64, at 225 (doubting that any patient would refuse medical treatment solely
because of the independent contractor status of their physician).
218. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (explaining how a hospital could use advertising to hold
a physician out as an employee of the hospital).
219. See Priestly, supra note 62, at 265 (noting the inequity that would result from such practices); see also
Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985) (acknowledging that it is unfair to bind the patient to a contract
of which he is not aware).
220. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing the significance courts placed on such ads),
221. See Priestly, supra note 62. at 265 (suggesting that to protect themselves from liability, hospitals might
have to go so far as to actually present written evidence to a court that the patient had knowledge of and consented
to the independent contractor relationship).
222. See Health Business, DELANEY REP. (Dec. 1. 1997), available in 1997 WL 14732086 (noting that two
prominent California HMOs had recently spent $15-20 million on advertising); Sandy Lutz, Tax-Exempts in New
Orleans Ahn to Compete Via Alliance, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 22, 1996, at 42 (asserting that while HMOs are
cutting physician reimbursement rates, they are spending millions of dollars on advertising); David R. Olmos,
Doctor Networks to Merge in Deal Worth $2.5 Million, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1996. at 1 (charging HMOs with
spending too much money on advertising and not enough money on patient care).
223. Health Net, (visited Feb. 3, 1998) <http://websrvrl.healthnet.com/web/general/about.htm> (noting
"Health Net is among the most respected health care companies in California. We have an extensive network of
over 35,000 physicians, 600 medical groups and affiliate locations, and 4,000 pharmacies -.-- all working together
to bring you quality health care.").
224. Mercy Health Plans Mission Statement, (visited Feb. 3, 1998) <http://www.carechoices.com/>
(describing the services offered by the company).
225. MD Health Plan, (visited Feb. 3, 1998) <http://www.mdhealthplan.com/> (advertising the health plan).
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On their face, these advertisements suggest an employment relationship, as did
the hospital advertisements mentioned above.2 6 When a company says that, "We
... all work[] together to bring you quality health care,' 227 it is hard to argue that
no working relationship exists between the people promising to provide the health
care and the peoplewho provide it on their behalf.
As for the company that has "effective partnerships with providers," - they
might try to argue that such language does not infer any sort of master-servant
association. However, since courts were unwilling to force patients to have
knowledge of respondeat superior principles in the hospital-physician context, 2 9
it is unlikely that they would now expect patients to scrutinize HMO slogans for the
existence of independent contractor relationships. And as for the company named
"MD Health Plan" it might be completely unreasonable to believe that such a
company does not employ any physicians." Thus, these advertisements appear to
hold physicians out as employees of HMOs.
HMOs clearly desire to distance themselves from physicians for purposes of
liability.2 1t But as a matter of marketing strategy, it might be unwise to emphasize
their lack of control over physicians. After all, no company would choose a health
plan for its employees if it advertised that: "We take absolutely no responsibility for
the mistakes of our doctors." But HMOs cannot have it both ways. Courts have
already recognized the unfairness of allowing hospitals to compete aggressively for
business while escaping liability for the negligent acts of those who bring patients
through the doors.Y2 Courts must recognize the same inequity in the HMO setting.
The HMO industry should not be able to use independent contractor
relationships with physicians to shield themselves from liability for malpractice. If
the same contractual associations were rejected by the courts as a way for hospitals
to shield themselves,z 3 there is no reason why contracting should provide immunity
from liability for managed care entities. The same policies that allowed patients to
sue hospitals should apply to lIMOs and should be used by the courts to keep
managed care companies from contracting their way out of liability.
226. See supra note 121-22 and accompanying text (noting the weight courts gave to advertisements offering
"skilled professionals" or a "full service facility").
227. Health Net, supra note 223.
228. Mercy Health Plans Mission Statement, supra note 224.
229. See Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. 1980) (noting the absurdity in requiring
a patient to be familiar enough with the law to be able to make inquiries about a physician's employment status).
230. MD Health Plan, supra note 225.
231. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that HMOs are setting up
independent contractor associations with physicians).
232. See supranotes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the role advertising played in hospitals losing
their immunity from liability for physician malpractice).
233. See supra Part II.D (discussing the reasons why hospitals could not use independent contractor
relationships to shield themselves from liability for physician malpractice).
349
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IV. CONCLUSION
Health Maintenance Organizations eluded responsibility for physician mal-
practice for a long time.2 When their immunity began to erode, they entered into
independent contractor relationships with their physicians. 5 Under traditional
principles of tort law, such tactics might work. But courts have already rejected
these principles in the hospital liability context.2 6 After enjoying a long period of
immunity from liability for physician malpractice, hospitals were made to answer
for the negligent acts of those practicing within their walls. Even independent con-
tractor relationships eventually failed to shield hospitals from liability. That
evolution was based on sound policy considerations.
Those same rationales dictate that in today's complex health care system,
HMOs must be made to answer for physician malpractice. z 7 Courts should reject
industry attempts to avoid liability through independent contracting and recognize
HMOs for what they are - entities that control the way doctors deliver health care
in America. Because of the size and strength of the HMO industry in the United
States today, courts should loosen managed care organizations' grip on consumers.
234. See supra Parts M.A - B (describing the immunity from liability HMOs have enjoyed under ERISA).
235. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (illustrating that HMOs have attempted to avoid liability
for physician malpractice through independent contracting with physicians).
236. See supra Part Ir.D (explaining why hospitals were unable to protect themselves from liability for
physician malpractice through independent contracting with physicians).
237. See supra notes Parts III.D - IV (arguing that like hospitals, HMOs should not be able to avoid liability
for physician malpractice).
